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TO CUT OR NOT TO CUT?: ADDRESSING PROPOSALS TO
BAN CIRCUMCISION UNDER BOTH A PARENTAL RIGHTS
THEORY AND CHILD-CENTERED PERSPECTIVE IN THE
SPECIFIC CONTEXT OF JEWISH AND MUSLIM INFANTS
Andrew E. Behrns*

INTRODUCTION
Recently, a popular cultural, societal, medical, and religious tradition has come
under attack. First, scholars and, more recently, citizens of San Francisco have called
for a ban on male circumcisions.1 For just over a decade now, scholars calling for an
end to the practice of male circumcision have gained little traction outside academia.
This was true until a recent ballot proposal in San Francisco, which essentially would
have forbidden the practice by criminalizing it, with few exceptions.2 Most noticeably,
the proposed ban, which was the first of its kind in the country, would not have allowed
for religious exemptions.3 Unsurprisingly, amid the outcry from religious groups, the
California state legislature and Governor Jerry Brown quashed the ballot proposal.4
* Andrew E. Behrns, J.D., 2012, William & Mary School of Law. First, special thanks are
due to my beautiful and patient wife Megan who continuously supported me in this endeavor
and had to endure my frequent ramblings. Thanks are also due to my Notes Editor, Davis
Walsh, for his wisdom and willingness to help focus and organize this Note, as well as to the
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal staff for their countless hours of hard work. I would
also like to express great appreciation for my parents, Kevin and Patti, and their lifelong support and encouragement of my academic pursuits. Finally, thanks to my Lord and Savior Jesus
Christ, the inspiration behind all that I pursue.
1
See, e.g., Ross Povenmire, Do Parents Have the Legal Authority to Consent to the
Surgical Amputation of Normal, Healthy Tissue From Their Infant Children?: The Practice
of Circumcision in the United States, 7 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 87 (1999) (arguing
that constitutional considerations outweigh parental consent for infant circumcision); Shea
Lita Bond, Comment, State Laws Criminalizing Female Circumcision: A Violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 353 (1999)
(arguing for a ban of male circumcision due to an equal protection violation that cannot be overcome by First Amendment claims); Robin Hindery, San Francisco Circumcision Ban to Appear
on Ballot, HUFFINGTON POST (May 18, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/18
/san-francisco-circumcision-ban_n_863945.html (noting that the initiative for a ban in San
Francisco had collected more than 7,700 signatures and thus qualified for the November ballot).
2
See Hindery, supra note 1.
3
Id.
4
Steven Harmon, Governor Jerry Brown Signs Bill Prohibiting Cities, Counties from
Banning Male Circumcision, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Oct. 3, 2011, http://web.archive
.org/web/20111101130501/http://www.mercurynews.com/california-budget/ci_19026518.
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San Francisco’s attempted ballot proposal, however, may just be the first political
rumblings of a larger battle yet to ensue over male circumcision.5
Arguably, the most controversial aspect of the San Francisco proposal is the
absence of a religious exemption.6 This controversy stems from the fact that male
circumcision is deeply embedded in religion, specifically Jewish and Islamic practices.7 Consequently, Jewish organizations have been among the loudest and most
active opponents of the proposed ban—asserting both parental choice rights and religious freedoms.8 Historically, arguments advocating for parental control and religious freedom, when coupled together, have received strong protection from the U.S.
Supreme Court.9
Proponents of banning male circumcision describe the procedure as torturous
and argue that it should not be afforded First Amendment protection or be subject
to parental rights claims.10 As an alternative ground for banning circumcision, some
have argued that the practice violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.11
In response to this debate, this Note analyzes infant male circumcision from
two distinct perspectives: a parental rights theory and a child-centered best-interests
approach.
5

While San Francisco’s proposed ban is the first ballot proposal, recently several states
have stripped Medicaid funding for infant circumcision. The laundry list of states includes
California, North Dakota, Oregon, Mississippi, Nevada, Washington, North Carolina, Arizona,
Missouri, Florida, Utah, Montana, Maine, Minnesota, Idaho, Louisiana, South Carolina, and
most recently, Colorado in June 2011. David March, Editorial, Efforts to Defund, Ban Infant
Male Circumcision Unfounded, JHU GAZETTE, Oct. 10, 2011, http://gazette.jhu.edu/2011/10
/10/efforts-to-defund-ban-infant-male-circumcision-unfounded/.
6
See, e.g., Harmon, supra note 4 (noting that a San Francisco judge categorized the proposal as one that “flouted U.S. Constitutional protections of religious freedom”); Hindery,
supra note 1 (noting concern from the Jewish community about the proposed ban, which lacks
religious exemptions).
7
Mark D. Jordan, The Body, in RELIGION AND AMERICAN CULTURES 333, 340 (Gary
Laderman & Luis León eds., 2003).
8
See James Nash, San Francisco Circumcision Fight Prompts Limits Signed by Brown,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-03/san-francisco
-circumcision-fight-prompts-limits-signed-by-brown.html (citing the Jewish Community
Relations Council of San Francisco’s concern that the ban “would restrict parental choice and
religious freedom”).
9
See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (“[A] State’s interest in universal education, however highly we rank it, is not totally free from a balancing process when
it impinges on fundamental rights and interests, such as those specifically protected by the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and the traditional interest of parents with respect
to the religious upbringing of their children so long as they . . . prepare [them] for additional
obligations.” (quoting Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
10
See generally Abbie J. Chessler, Comment, Justifying the Unjustifiable: Rite v. Wrong,
45 BUFF. L. REV. 555 (1997).
11
See, e.g., Povenmire, supra note 1, at 119–22.
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Before addressing these approaches, Part I provides background material on the
historical and religious origins of male circumcision. Part II then examines the constitutional claims likely to be brought under a parental rights theory—parental and
free exercise claims. Part II also considers whether these rights can be conjoined to
form a hybrid-rights claim requiring the application of strict scrutiny. In finding that
they do form a hybrid-rights claim, Part II lays out what strict scrutiny means in the
context of circumcision. Part III examines the issues implicated by a child-centered
approach. First, it addresses threshold issues and finds that the applicable approach is
a best-interests inquiry. Then, Part III lays out how best-interests analysis operates and
what are the key considerations in its application. Next, Part IV applies each approach.
Part IV concludes that under a parental rights analysis, bans on circumcision do not satisfy strict scrutiny, because the health risks associated with circumcision are minimal.
Finally, Part V argues that due to the medical and emotional benefits associated with
circumcision for Jewish and Muslim infants, the procedure is in their best interests.
I. BACKGROUND: HISTORICAL AND RELIGIOUS ORIGINS OF CIRCUMCISION
Many associate the beginning of male circumcision with either Judaism or, for
non-Jewish men in the United States, with the anti-masturbation movement in the late
1800s.12 The origins of male circumcision, however, can be traced as far back as ancient Egypt.13 For the Egyptians, the practice of circumcision was a combining of the
medical and the mystic in a process of refinement.14 As a result, circumcision became
identified with prominence and was the aspiration of many.15
With its origins in Egypt, circumcision soon became one of the defining acts of
the monotheistic Jewish culture.16 The oldest reference to the actual practice of circumcision in the Jewish Torah is from a story about Moses and his wife, Zipporah17:
At a lodging place on the way the Lord met him [Moses] and
sought to put him to death. Then Zipporah took a flint and cut
off her son’s foreskin and touched Moses’ feet with it and said,
“Surely you are a bridegroom of blood to me!” So he let him
alone. It was then that she said, “A bridegroom of blood,” because of the circumcision.18
12

See, e.g., id. at 91.
DAVID L. GOLLAHER, CIRCUMCISION: A HISTORY OF THE WORLD’S MOST CONTROVERSIAL SURGERY 1–3 (2000). The oldest reference to male circumcision rests on a tomb near
ancient Memphis where there is a depiction, which dates to roughly 2400 B.C., of a priest performing a circumcision on two young males. Id. at 1–2. Other evidence of Egyptian mummies
indicates that circumcision may date back as far as 4000 B.C. Id. at 3.
14
Id. at 6.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
See id. at 7.
18
Exodus 4:24–26 (English Standard Version).
13
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While this passage cites the first actual performance of a circumcision recorded in
the Torah, the defining significance of circumcision in the Jewish faith is properly
associated with Abraham.19 In fact, the encounter between God and Abraham concerning circumcision is considered to be the key foundation of the Jewish faith.20 The
critical passage is found in the book of Genesis:
And God said to Abraham, “As for you, you shall keep my covenant, you and your offspring after you throughout their generations.
This is my covenant, which you shall keep, between me and you
and your offspring after you: Every male among you shall be
circumcised. You shall be circumcised in the flesh of your foreskins, and it shall be a sign of the covenant between me and you.
He who is eight days old among you shall be circumcised. Every
male throughout your generations, whether born in your house or
bought with your money from any foreigner who is not of your
offspring, both he who is born in your house and he who is bought
with your money, shall surely be circumcised. So shall my covenant be in your flesh an everlasting covenant. Any uncircumcised
male who is not circumcised in the flesh of his foreskin shall be
cut off from his people; he has broken my covenant.”21
This passage denotes two critically important aspects of circumcision in Judaism:
1) that circumcision is the oldest Jewish practice, and 2) it is the symbol of God’s
covenant with the Jewish people, which forms the basis and foundation of the whole
faith.22 In Judaism, the practice of circumcision is known as Brit Milah (“covenant of
circumcision”).23 This covenant is “so central to Jewish life, that it takes precedence
over everything else—including Shabbat and even Yom Kippur.”24
During the early periods of the Christian church, circumcision remained important to the Jews, as it visibly designated membership in the Jewish faith.25 More
19

See GOLLAHER, supra note 13, at 8.
Id.
21
Genesis 17:9–14 (English Standard Version) (emphasis added).
22
MICHAEL KEENE, THIS IS JUDAISM 58 (1996).
23
WAYNE DOSICK, LIVING JUDAISM 285 (1995).
24
Id. at 286.
25
LAWRENCE A. HOFFMAN, COVENANT OF BLOOD: CIRCUMCISION AND GENDER IN
RABBINIC JUDAISM 9 (1996). Other examples can be found outside of the traditional Jewish
or Christian texts, such as in the accounts of Josephus. Id. Josephus recounts the life of two
somewhat insignificant Jews: Herod the Great and his grandson Agrippa. Id. Both men at one
point ruled Judea and thus had to demonstrate that they were Jewish. Id. In Josephus’s first
account, Herod’s sister, Salome, wanted to marry Sylleus, the prime minister of an Arabian
king. Id. at 9–10. Herod allowed Salome to marry Sylleus on one condition—that Sylleus be
circumcised. Id. at 10. Similarly in the second account, Agrippa, who was initially reluctant
to become the king, was eventually remembered for allowing his daughter to marry a foreign
king only if the foreigner would be circumcised. Id.
20
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appropriately, the significance of circumcision in the Jewish faith may best be seen
in the Reform movement of the 1800s.26 “Indeed, the reformers abandoned nearly all
major tenets of traditional Judaism except circumcision.”27
Still today, circumcision remains important in the Jewish faith for two reasons.
First, during the ceremony the child receives a blessing from his father, which has
been very important to the practice since its Abrahamic beginnings.28 Second, it is the
process by which the baby is welcomed into the Jewish community and gets to share
in the blessings of God’s covenant.29
In addition to Judaism, circumcision is a practice closely observed in Islam.30 Unlike in Judaism, however, the Koran does not provide clear authority on circumcision.31
Yet, circumcision is considered by many a required practice, based both on tradition
and Muhammad’s example.32 The practice symbolizes a submission to God’s will and
a surrendering of immoral sexual desires.33 When performed on adolescent boys, it is
considered a passage into manhood and allows the boy to regularly participate in public prayer.34 Notably, while the practice of male circumcision is obligatory, female
circumcision is not an official Islamic practice.35
Meanwhile, the origins of circumcision in the United States, as separate from
citizens’ individual religions, are found in the underpinnings of the anti-masturbation
movement of the late nineteenth century.36 The practice became commonplace in the
early 1900s as new justifications developed.37 Among the new justifications were a
belief in hygienic benefits,38 effective treatment for neurological disorders,39 and a
26

See ERIC KLINE SILVERMAN, FROM ABRAHAM TO AMERICA: A HISTORY OF JEWISH
CIRCUMCISION 186 (2006).
27
Id. (noting that while the Reform Judaism movement did technically deny the obligatory
status of circumcision, it fully “affirmed the meaningfulness of the rite” and the importance
of the tradition).
28
KEENE, supra note 22, at 58.
29
Id.
30
See JOHN L. ESPOSITO, WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW ABOUT ISLAM 110 (2d ed.
2011).
31
MALE AND FEMALE CIRCUMCISION 137 (George C. Denniston et al. eds., 1999).
32
See ESPOSITO, supra note 30, at 110. This also includes the practice of adult male circumcision as some Muslims believe that circumcision is required for true conversion to the faith. Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 111.
36
See Povenmire, supra note 1, at 91 (citing Phil Nguyen, Foreskin Envy: Circumcising
Our Sons, VIETNOW MAG., July 31, 1997, at 50) (stating that circumcisions were believed
to help decrease masturbation).
37
Id.
38
See id. at 91–92 (citing Charles J. Schleupner, Urinary Tract Infections Separating the
Genders and the Ages, 101 POSTGRADUATE MED. 231 (1997)) (stating that circumcised boys
have lower incidence of urinary tract infections than those who are uncircumcised).
39
E. Charlisse Caga-anan & Anthony J. Thomas, Jr., Requests for “Non-Therapeutic”
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decrease in sexually transmitted diseases.40 During the past quarter century, however,
several groups in the United States have condemned the practice and questioned its
supposed benefits.41 Despite criticisms of the justifications for circumcision, there
remains a belief in its benefits.42 American Jews and Muslims still promote the benefits and importance of the practice today.43
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES: CLAIMS BROUGHT BY PARENTS
The first issue this Note examines is the constitutional claims likely to be brought
by Jewish and Muslim parents. These claims include parents’ fundamental right to
direct the upbringing of their child under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment44 and the right to the free exercise of religion granted by the First
Amendment.45 As a part of this examination it is important to determine whether the
combination of these rights provides parents any extra protection under the hybridrights exception, and if so, what are the implications.
A. Parental Rights Claims
Several cases have found that parental rights are a fundamental interest protected
by the U.S. Constitution.46 The Supreme Court first adopted the notion of parents’
Interventions in Children: Male Circumcision, in CLINICAL ETHICS IN PEDIATRICS 43, 44
(Douglas S. Diekema et al. eds., 2011).
40
See EDWARD WALLERSTEIN, CIRCUMCISION: AN AMERICAN HEALTH FALLACY 80–85
(1980) (finding that this belief was likely based on the fact that venereal diseases were less
common in the Jewish community in the late 1800s).
41
See Edgar J. Schoen, Male Circumcision, in MALE SEXUAL DYSFUNCTION 95, 102–03
(Fouad R. Kandeel et al. eds., 2007) (discussing the anticircumcision movement).
42
Povenmire, supra note 1, at 93; see also infra Part IV.B.1 (noting findings that circumcision provides tangible health benefits to children).
43
In the United States there are approximately 6.5 million Jews and 1.4 million Muslims.
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012, at 61–62.
Significantly, the Muslim population has nearly tripled in the past twenty years. See id.
44
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
45
See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
46
See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (affirming the right of parents to rear their
children and striking down a Washington state law that allowed any third party to petition state
courts for child visitation rights over the objections of the parents); see also Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (noting that parents have a right, which is embedded in the
American tradition, to direct the upbringing of their child); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 166 (1944) (finding that parents bear the primary responsibility for care of children); Pierce
v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (holding Oregon’s Compulsory Education Act
unconstitutional in part because parents have a right to “direct the [religious] upbringing . . .
of [their] children” and to control the process of their education); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 400, 402 (1923) (holding that the law restricting foreign language teaching at school
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rights in Meyer v. Nebraska,47 in 1923, when it held that parents have the fundamental
right to instruct their children in a foreign language.48 The Court found that this fundamental right derived from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which
grants parents the right to “establish a home and bring up [their] children.”49
Just two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,50 the Court struck down the
Oregon Compulsory Education Act which required children to attend public schools
and forbade them to attend private school.51 In affirming parental rights, the Court
found that “[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare
him for additional obligations.”52
Roughly twenty years later, in 1944, the Court stated in Prince v. Massachusetts53
that “[i]t is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first
in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations
the state can neither supply nor hinder.”54 Despite this high regard for parental rights,
the Court further noted that parental rights are not “beyond limitation,” and upheld
Massachusetts’s child labor law against a mother’s desire to have her daughter distribute religious literature on the street.55 Notably, however, the Court qualified and
greatly limited this holding by stating:
Our ruling does not extend beyond the facts the case presents.
We neither lay the foundation “for any [that is, every] state intervention in the indoctrination and participation of children in
religion” which may be done “in the name of their health and
welfare” nor give warrant for “every limitation on their religious
training and activities.”56
Later, in 1972, the Court decided a watershed case in parents’ rights, Wisconsin v.
Yoder.57 In Yoder, an Amish family challenged a Wisconsin compulsory education law
that required school attendance by all children until they reached the age of sixteen.58
interfered with “the natural duty of the parent to give his children education suitable to their
station in life”).
47
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
48
Id. at 400.
49
Id. at 399.
50
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
51
Id. at 534–35.
52
Id. at 535.
53
321 U.S. 158 (1944).
54
Id. at 166.
55
Id. at 166, 168–70.
56
Id. at 171.
57
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
58
Id. at 207.

932

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:925

The challenge was based on Amish religious concepts to which the teachings of schools
after eighth grade were repugnant, because the Amish faith required that parents raise
their kids with Amish values and in the Amish way of life after the eighth grade.59 The
Court held that under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, Wisconsin could not compel the Amish parents to send their children to formal school through age sixteen.60
Legally, the case involved: “the fundamental interest of parents, as contrasted with
that of the State, to guide the religious future and education of their children. . . . This
primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond
debate as an enduring American tradition.”61 In making this declaration, the Court
was expressing disdain at the notion that the State may or should “influence . . . the
religious future of the child.”62 The Court further elaborated that “[t]he [parents’] duty
to prepare the child for ‘additional obligations . . .’ must be read to include the inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship.”63
Interestingly, Justice Douglas argued in dissent that the Court had wrongly decided the matter by not considering the religious beliefs of the Amish children.64 The
Court, however, rejected this argument by finding that the religious rights of the child
were not implicated in the case.65 The Court pointed out that the children were not
parties to the suit and that the state’s prosecution was focused on the parents’ failure
to send their children to school.66
With this foundational backdrop of the fundamental nature of parents’ rights, the
Supreme Court, in a case particularly germane to circumcision, Parham v. J.R.,67 found
that parents have the right to make medical decisions for their children.68 The Court
cited a principle from Yoder and Prince that parents do not have unlimited control
when the child’s health is implicated.69 Yet, the Court held that a parent could voluntarily institutionalize his or her child for mental health care so long as a neutral authority
(i.e., a physician, not the State) approved the decision.70
Throughout the opinion, the Court went to great lengths to reiterate the strong
interests that parents have in decisions concerning their children.71 To this effect, the
Court stated that “[t]he law’s concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71

Id. at 209–12.
Id. at 234.
Id. at 232.
Id.
Id. at 233 (quoting Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925)).
Id. at 241 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 230–31 (majority opinion).
Id. at 231.
442 U.S. 584 (1979).
Id. at 603–04.
Id. at 603.
Id. at 606–07.
See generally Parham, 442 U.S. 584.
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possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life’s difficult decisions.”72 In light of this, there is a historical presumption that parents act in the “best interests of their children.”73 The Court further
articulated that:
[s]imply because the decision of a parent is not agreeable to a
child or because it involves risks does not automatically transfer
the power to make that decision from the parents to some agency
or officer of the state. The same characterizations can be made
for a tonsillectomy, appendectomy, or other medical procedure.
Most children . . . simply are not able to make sound judgments
concerning many decisions, including their need for medical care
or treatment.74
While acknowledging the strong interest of parents in making medical decisions for
their children, the Court also noted the existence of neglect and abuse in some cases,
which consequently implicates the interests of the State.75 However, the Court found
that the fears of neglect or abuse could be quelled by the agreement of a “neutral factfinder” speaking on the child’s behalf.76 In cases regarding medical issues, the Court
established that a physician is an appropriate neutral fact-finder.77
B. Free Exercise Claims
In order for an individual to make a Free Exercise claim, the individual must have
a sincerely held religious belief.78 This belief does not have to be the prevailing view
within the faith, so long as it is sincerely held, because “[c]ourts are not arbiters of
scriptural interpretation.”79 In addition, the individual must prove that his or her belief
is, in fact, in conflict with and inseparable from the law (i.e., the state’s infringement).80
72

Id. at 602.
Id.
74
Id. at 603 (emphasis added).
75
Id. at 602.
76
Id. at 606–07.
77
See id.
78
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1189–90
(3d ed. 2006). While the sincerity of the belief is open to judicial review, the truth or falsity of
the belief is not. See id. (“Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to
the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs.” (quoting United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S.
78, 86 (1944))). Yet, the sincerely held belief must have a “religious basis” and not merely
be a philosophical belief. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972).
79
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715–16 (1981).
80
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
73
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In Yoder, the Court found that the Amish held a sincere belief, which was predicated
on the phrase “be not conformed to this world,” from Paul’s letter to the Romans, and
that their way of life was in conflict with the Wisconsin statute.81 In short, the Court
found that “[t]his command [was] fundamental to the Amish faith.”82 The Court further
noted that the Amish way of life had remained consistent despite vast societal changes
and developments.83
In applying this analysis to the circumcision context, it is clear that Jewish and
Muslim parents could meet the threshold inquiry of a sincerely held religious belief.
Because circumcision is a strict mandate in both religions,84 the practice would meet the
sincerely held belief requirement. Further, a law banning circumcision without religious
exceptions would conflict with the belief that circumcisions are religiously obligatory.85
Historically, such state intrusions on religious activities were subject to strict scrutiny review.86 That is, in order for the state’s infringement on citizens’ First Amendment
rights to satisfy constitutional strict scrutiny, the state must have a compelling interest.87
The Court has articulated that the compelling interest standard applies “[o]nly [to] the
gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests.”88 As a result, a state’s mere articulation of its police power is not sufficient.
In 1990, however, the Supreme Court in Employment Division v. Smith89 greatly
diminished the protection provided by the Free Exercise Clause.90 In Smith, the Court
held that free exercise claims are not protected against a “neutral law of general applicability,” unless the law fails rational basis review.91 Put differently, a law can burden religious activity as long as it is not motivated by a desire to interfere with that
81

Id. at 216–17.
Id. at 216.
83
See id. at 216–17.
84
See supra Part I (discussing the historical and religious origins of circumcision).
85
See supra notes 20–35 and accompanying text.
86
Technically the Supreme Court did not articulate a standard of review until Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), in 1963, but functionally, and in that case, the Court determined
that strict scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review for evaluating laws that restrict or
burden the free exercise of religion. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 78, at 1247.
87
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
88
Id. (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
89
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
90
The decision essentially eroded the application of strict scrutiny to free exercise claims.
This erosion is articulated by Justice Scalia’s remarks that:
Precisely because “we are a cosmopolitan nation made up of people of
almost every conceivable religious preference,” and precisely because
we value and protect that religious divergence, we cannot afford the
luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious
objector, every regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest of
the highest order.
Id. at 888 (citations omitted) (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961)).
91
Id. at 879.
82
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particular religious practice.92 If, however, the law does target a particular religious
practice, then strict scrutiny is applied.93
In Smith, the Court found Oregon’s law prohibiting the use of peyote to be a
neutral law of general applicability.94 Importantly, however, the Court distinguished
Smith from previous cases which applied strict scrutiny, such as Yoder, on the grounds
that the previous cases involved hybrid claims.95 The Court elaborated that all prior
cases applying strict scrutiny involved “the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with
other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press or the
right of parents.”96 The Free Exercise claim in Smith, therefore, was distinguishable
because it was “unconnected with any communicative activity or parental right.”97 This
finding by the Court seems to suggest that when a free exercise claim is combined with
another fundamental right, such as parental rights, the applicable constitutional standard of review is strict scrutiny.
C. Hybrid Claims
As noted above, Smith carved out a special space for “hybrid situation[s]” of fundamental rights.98 Unfortunately, the Court did not expand on the applicability and appropriate analysis for hybrid claims.99 Consequently, lower courts have had a difficult time
understanding and applying the hybrid-rights exception.100 As a result, a few courts
refuse to recognize hybrid rights and instead apply rational basis review for all cases
in which there is a neutral law of general applicability.101
Most courts, however, presume the hybrid-rights exception establishes that when
a free exercise claim is combined with another fundamental right, the applicable
constitutional standard is strict scrutiny.102 These courts, though differing in their
analysis of what triggers the hybrid-claim exception, agree on two key points: first,
hybrid claims must be a rare exception; and second, and most importantly, the hybrid
92

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 78, at 1248.
See Church of the Lukumi Babulu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531–32
(1993).
94
Smith, 494 U.S. at 882.
95
Id. at 881–82.
96
Id. at 881 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
97
Id. at 882.
98
See id.
99
Benjamin I. Siminou, Note, Making Sense of Hybrid Rights: An Analysis of the Nebraska
Supreme Court’s Approach to the Hybrid-Rights Exception in Douglas County v. Anaya, 85
NEB. L. REV. 311, 316 (2006).
100
Id. at 316–17.
101
Id. at 317 (citing Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 144 (2d Cir. 2003)).
102
See id.
93
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claim must be “consisten[t] with Supreme Court precedent.”103 In courts applying
the hybrid-claims exception, three approaches have emerged104: the independently
viable claim approach;105 the colorable-claim approach;106 and the genuinely implicated approach.107
Benjamin Siminou argues that the genuinely implicated approach is the most
coherent option as it most effectively preserves the hybrid-rights doctrine as a narrow exception and is most consistent with Supreme Court precedent.108 Under the
genuinely implicated approach, a hybrid-rights claim is effectively invoked when the
companion claim is one of the three acceptable claims established in Smith’s hybridrights paragraph, and when the challenged law “genuinely implicates” the companion
claim.109 Thus, to pass the first prong the claimant must assert at least one companion
claim of freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of association, or the rights
of parents, in conjunction with the free exercise claim.110 The second prong focuses
on whether the companion claim is legitimately implicated by the challenged law.111
If both prongs are satisfied, a valid hybrid-rights claim exists and strict scrutiny should
be applied.112
Under this genuinely implicated approach, Jewish and Muslim parents have valid
hybrid-rights claims in challenging anti-circumcision laws. The first prong is sufficiently met as the asserted companion claim fits under the Smith paradigm—the right
of parents.113 Moreover, parents’ rights are certainly legitimately implicated in decisions regarding the medical treatment—such as circumcision—of their child.114 As a
result, strict scrutiny must apply to their claims.
Simply because strict scrutiny applies, however, does not assure parents a victory.
As the Court noted in Prince, parental rights claims, even when coupled with religious
claims meeting the hybrid-rights exception, are not protected when they threaten the
well-being of the child.115 To this end, courts have found that the state can mandate
103

Id. at 317–18 (quoting Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 165 F.3d 692, 705
(9th Cir. 1999)).
104
See id. at 318–26.
105
See id. at 319–20 (citing Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 539
(1st Cir. 1995)).
106
See id. at 320–23 (citing Swanson ex rel. Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L,
135 F.3d 694, 700 (10th Cir. 1998)).
107
See id. at 324–26 (describing the “genuinely-implicated” approach and arguing that it
is the most effective approach of the existing approaches to hybrid-rights claims).
108
See id. at 340–46.
109
Id. at 324.
110
See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990).
111
Siminou, supra note 99, at 324.
112
See id. at 326, 348.
113
See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
114
See supra notes 67–77 and accompanying text.
115
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944).
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blood transfusions or withdrawals, under its parens patriae power, even when they
are against the wishes of the parents.116 One such case was Jehovah’s Witnesses v.
King County Hospital,117 in which the Supreme Court upheld a district court decision mandating a blood transfusion for a minor, over the parents’ objection, when it
was medically necessary to protect the life of the minor.118 In line with this, “[c]ourts
have uniformly permitted state officials to order medical treatment where necessary to
save the life of a child.”119 Additionally, some courts have even given the state medical
decision-making power over parental and religious claims when the threat of serious
or grievous injury to the child is imminent.120 Yet, no court has overridden parental
and religious objections when presented with less serious risks.121
D. What Is Strict Scrutiny in this Context?
Under strict scrutiny the state must express a compelling interest.122 A compelling
interest must implicate “paramount interests” and the abuse of this interest must be
grave.123 In addition, to pass strict scrutiny the law must be narrowly tailored to achieve
the compelling interest in the least restrictive manner possible.124 The state’s likely
asserted interest in preventing circumcision, protecting the safety and privacy interests of the child, is on its face a paramount interest. So too, however, are the rights of
Jewish and Muslim parents—the free exercise of religion and the right of parents to
direct the upbringing of their children.125 When there are such competing interests
under strict scrutiny, the analysis of whether the law is narrowly tailored generally
becomes a balancing test of the competing interests.126 This balancing approach is
116

See, e.g., Jehovah’s Witnesses v. King Cnty. Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488, 498–99, 508
(W.D. Wash. 1967), aff’d, 390 U.S. 598 (1968); Douglas Cnty. v. Anaya, 694 N.W.2d 601,
608 (Neb. 2005).
117
278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967), aff’d, 390 U.S. 598 (1968).
118
Id. at 505.
119
James G. Dwyer, Parents’ Religion and Children’s Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine
of Parents’ Rights, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1371, 1399 (1994).
120
See, e.g., Muhlenberg Hosp. v. Patterson, 320 A.2d 518, 520 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1974).
121
Dwyer, supra note 119, at 1399.
122
See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (citing Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
123
Id.
124
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) (“The state may justify an inroad on
religious liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling
state interest.”).
125
See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972).
126
See id.; Eugene Volokh, Essay, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and
Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2438–40 (1996); Adam Winkler,
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used to verify that the government’s underlying reasons are legitimate, and that the
government truly believes the ends are necessarily compelling.127
In cases where parents assert hybrid claims related to the medical treatment of
their child, such as circumcision, this balancing approach would appear to hinge on
the severity of the risks.128 As noted above, the State meets strict scrutiny and overrides parental rights and free exercise claims in medical cases when the situation
threatens the life of the child or places the child at risk of serious or grievous injury.129
Conversely, no courts have found that the presence of less serious risks satisfies
strict scrutiny.130
III. FAMILY LAW ISSUES: CONSIDERATION OF THE CHILD
Generally, when parents’ religious and parental claims are present, courts analyze
the issue solely from this framework and dismiss the rights and interests of the child.131
This has drawn the ire of child-rights advocates who believe that the child is the primary rights-holder and should be considered independent of his parents’ rights.132 Such
advocates espouse a child-centered approach which focuses on the rights of the child
while disregarding the rights of the parents.133
The admonitions of child-centered advocates are respectable, but the difficulty remains that the infant cannot express his own rights and interests (i.e., does he want to
be circumcised?). As the law currently exists, the child-centered approach is best applied through a best interests analysis under traditional family law doctrine.134 Accordingly, this Note now examines the issues present in a child-centered approach.
A. What Rights Do Newborn Infants Have?
The initial question that must be answered is whether newborn infants have rights,
and if so, to what degree. The notion of children’s constitutional rights began to emerge
Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal
Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 803–05 (2006).
127
Winkler, supra note 126, at 803.
128
See supra notes 115–21 and accompanying text.
129
See supra notes 115–21 and accompanying text.
130
See supra notes 115–21 and accompanying text.
131
See, e.g., Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie That Binds: The Constitutional Right of Children
to Maintain Relationships with Parent-Like Individuals, 53 MD. L. REV. 358, 385–86 (1994)
(noting that though children have constitutional rights, they are usually less protected than
adults’ rights and often subjugated to the rights of their adult caretakers).
132
See, e.g., Dwyer, supra note 119, at 1446–47.
133
See James G. Dwyer, A Child-Centered Approach to Parentage Law, 14 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 843, 844 (2006).
134
See J. Steven Svoboda et al., Informed Consent for Neonatal Circumcision: An Ethical
and Legal Conundrum, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 61, 83–84 (2000).
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in the 1960s with the granting of procedural due process rights in In re Gault.135 In In
re Gault, the Supreme Court pronounced that “neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor
the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.”136 Children’s constitutional rights received a further boost in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth137 when the Court
declared that “[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically
only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are
protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights.”138
While these declarations by the Court suggest that children have full and complete
constitutional rights, in reality children’s rights are less protected than adults’ constitutional rights.139 Justification for this resides in the belief that children are not fully
capable of making individual decisions and are ultimately under the control of either
their parents or the state.140 From a child-centered perspective, however, this justification is moot as the inquiry and focus rest solely on the assumption that the child has
full rights and interests.141
B. Threshold Issue: Informed Consent by Proxy
An initial threshold issue which must be addressed is the problem posed by the
doctrine of informed consent. At its constitutional core, informed consent is based on
the rights to privacy, bodily integrity, and medical decision making.142 According to
the Supreme Court, the doctrine of informed consent suggests that there is a “sphere
within which the individual may assert the supremacy of his own will and rightfully
dispute the authority of any human government . . . to interfere with the exercise of
that will.”143 As a practical matter, however, informed consent cannot be challenged
until a lawsuit is brought after a patient has been harmed.144 The precise definition of
informed consent varies by jurisdiction but generally four main elements are present:
(1) a physician’s duty to disclose material risks; (2) the failure to
disclose or inadequate disclosure of those risks; (3) as a direct
and proximate result of the failure to disclose, the patient consented
135

387 U.S. 1 (1967).
Id. at 13.
137
428 U.S. 52 (1976).
138
Id. at 74.
139
See Laurence D. Houlgate, Three Concepts of Children’s Constitutional Rights: Reflections on the Enjoyment Theory, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 77, 78–79 (1999).
140
See id. at 78–80.
141
See supra notes 132–33 and accompanying text.
142
See Elizabeth B. Cooper, Testing for Genetic Traits: The Need for a New Legal Doctrine
of Informed Consent, 58 MD. L. REV. 346, 370 (1999).
143
Id. (quoting Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905)).
144
Teresa K. Baumann, Note, Proxy Consent and a National DNA Databank: An Unethical
and Discriminatory Combination, 86 IOWA L. REV. 667, 691 (2001).
136
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to treatment to which [he] otherwise would not have consented;
and (4) the patient was injured by the proposed treatment.145
What constitutes a material risk has traditionally been determined by the application
of a reasonable physician standard, though some jurisdictions apply a reasonable patient standard.146 The underlying goal from either perspective is to determine whether
or not the patient was indeed making an individual, informed decision.147
From a medical perspective, informed consent “is a process of communication
between a patient and physician that results in the patient’s authorization or agreement to undergo a specific medical intervention.”148 An important underlying element of informed consent, therefore, is that the patient must be competent in order to
give informed consent.149 Thus for infants who cannot be legally competent, the issue
becomes whether informed consent may be exercised via a proxy or surrogate.150
Understandably, the idea of proxy consent is somewhat troubling for pediatric healthcare providers whose legal and ethical duties become blurred when the patient is no
145

Cooper, supra note 142, at 378. Medical sources have also produced findings on what
constitutes informed consent, such as the Committee on Bioethics for the American Academy
of Pediatrics which has found that the focus is on:
1. Provision of information: patients should have explanations, in understandable language, of the nature of the ailment or condition; the nature
of proposed diagnostic steps and/or treatment(s) and the probability of
their success; the existence and nature of the risks involved; and the existence, potential benefits, and risks of recommended alternative treatments (including the choice of no treatment).
2. Assessment of the patient’s understanding of the above information.
3. Assessment, if only tacit, of the capacity of the patient or surrogate to
make the necessary decision(s).
4. Assurance, insofar as possible, that the patient has the freedom to
choose among the medical alternatives without coercion or manipulation.
Comm. on Bioethics, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Informed Consent, Parental Permission, and
Assent in Pediatric Practice, 95 PEDIATRICS 314, 315 (1995). Additionally, according to the
American Medical Association website physicians should disclose:
The patient’s diagnosis, if known; [t]he nature and purpose of a proposed
treatment or procedure; [t]he risks and benefits of a proposed treatment
or procedure; [a]lternatives (regardless of their cost or the extent to which
the treatment options are covered by health insurance); [t]he risks and
benefits of the alternative treatment or procedure; and [t]he risks and
benefits of not receiving or undergoing a treatment or procedure.
Informed Consent, AM. MED. ASS’N, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources
/legal-topics/patient-physician-relationship-topics/informed-consent.page (last visited Mar. 15,
2013) [hereinafter Informed Consent].
146
Cooper, supra note 142, at 379–80.
147
See id.
148
Informed Consent, supra note 145.
149
See Comm. on Bioethics, supra note 145, at 314.
150
See id.
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longer the decision maker.151 Yet, every state has a statute allowing for proxy consent
for treatments or procedures.152
The American Academy of Pediatrics (Academy) has acknowledged that infants
do not have the requisite competency to give informed consent and in these circumstances the “parents or other surrogates provide informed permission for diagnosis and
treatment.”153 The informed permission standard for parents or surrogates is the same
standard applied to informed consent.154 Moreover, particularly germane to the issue
at hand, the Academy has found that informed permission or consent is important because, for “patients and family members, personal values affect health care decisions,
and physicians have a duty to respect the autonomy, rights, and preferences of their
patients and their surrogates.”155 In light of the Academy’s views and nationwide acceptance of proxy consent, the real issue is not whether proxy consent is allowed, but
rather, with whom should the proxy power rest.156
C. Best-Interests Analysis: Determining Who Has the Power of Proxy
In determining whether the procedure of circumcision is appropriate, a court would
have to “insert [itself] into decision-making on behalf of children.”157 Functionally the
court is determining with whom the power of decision should lie: parents or the state?158
The basic test applied by courts in these cases is a best-interests test.159
Most commonly, the surrogate decision-making power is awarded to the child’s
parents.160 Parents are appointed with this power because they are generally in the best
position to make the decision due to their closeness with the child.161 Indeed, the Academy also recognizes that “[u]sually, parental permission articulates what most agree
represents the ‘best interests of the child.’”162 Yet, parental decision-making autonomy on medical issues has been diminished in the past thirty years.163 Consequently,
151

See id. at 315.
See Elyn R. Saks et al., Proxy Consent to Research: The Legal Landscape, 8 YALE J.
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 37, 60 (2008).
153
Comm. on Bioethics, supra note 145, at 314.
154
Id. at 315.
155
Id. at 314.
156
See Mary B. Mahowald, Decisions Regarding Disabled Newborns, in READINGS IN
HEALTH CARE ETHICS 330, 333 (Elisabeth Boetzkes & Wilfrid J. Waluchow eds., 2000).
157
Svoboda et al., supra note 134, at 84.
158
See id. at 83–84.
159
See id. at 84.
160
See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“[T]he custody, care and
nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder” (citing Pierce v. Soc’y of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925))).
161
See Mahowald, supra note 156, at 333.
162
Comm. on Bioethics, supra note 145, at 315.
163
See Craig A. Conway, Baby Doe and Beyond: Examining the Practical and Philosophical
152
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in non-medically necessary contexts, such as circumcision, parents must demonstrate to the court that the procedure is in fact in the best interests of the child.164
On the other side of the analysis is the State and its parens patriae power.165
Parens patriae, which literally means “parent of the country,” is the state’s power
to care for and protect its citizens.166 Under this power the state has an interest in promoting and protecting the welfare of children.167 Normally, in order for the state to
exercise its power of parens patriae and interfere with the parents’ fundamental rights,
the state must have a compelling interest.168 However, in the context of a child-centered
approach, the parents’ fundamental rights are not under consideration. Thus, the state
must prove to the court that it will actually protect the child from the alleged harm, and
that this protection is in the best interests of the child.169 In this child-centered approach,
it thus becomes a duel between the parents and the state over who is protecting the best
interests of the child.
The application of best-interests tests and analysis varies by jurisdiction.170 Two
predominant approaches have developed: substituted judgment, and a best-interests
approach.171 In theory, under the substituted judgment approach, the court defers to the
surrogate decisionmaker, who is presumably asserting the judgment the patient would
have if competent.172 Ultimately, however, this approach is often seen as a more subjective approach.173 In light of the subjectivity often associated with substituted judgment,
some courts have attempted to develop a more objective approach understood to be
the best-interests approach.174 While different in name and in theory, the best-interests
approach has often become blurred with the substituted judgment approach.175 This
Influences Impacting Medical Decision-Making on Behalf of Marginally-Viable Newborns,
25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1097, 1103 (2009).
164
Svoboda et al., supra note 134, at 88; see also Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386, 390 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1972) (“There is authority in our American jurisdiction that nontherapeutic operations can be legally permitted on a minor as long as the parents or other guardians consent to
the procedure.”).
165
See Svoboda et al., supra note 134, at 83–84.
166
Natalie Loder Clark, Parens Patriae and a Modest Proposal for the Twenty-First
Century: Legal Philosophy and A New Look at Children’s Welfare, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L.
381, 382 (2000).
167
See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982).
168
See, e.g., id. at 758–59.
169
Amy Wilkinson-Hagen, Note, The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997: A Collision
of Parens Patriae and Parents’ Constitutional Rights, 11 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 137,
149 (2004).
170
See Svoboda et al., supra note 134, at 88.
171
Id.
172
See RAYMOND J. DEVETTERE, PRACTICAL DECISION MAKING IN HEALTH CARE ETHICS
101 (3d ed. 2009).
173
See Svoboda et al., supra note 134, at 88.
174
Id.
175
Lynn E. Lebit, Compelled Medical Procedures Involving Minors and Incompetents and
Misapplication of the Substituted Judgment Doctrine, 7 J.L. & HEALTH 107, 108 (1993)
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may be due to the fact that the best-interests approach is often a fallback approach when
substituted judgment cannot be properly applied because the wishes of the patient are
not known.176
From a theoretical standpoint, therefore, the best-interests approach is the appropriate approach in the circumcision context as the desires of the infant have not been
articulated. In general, the “best interests” approach focuses on what is the best net
benefit for the particular patient with consideration given to all relevant factors.177 The
major benefits considered by courts are the potential medical and emotional benefits.178
In considering emotional benefits, courts have considered the importance of relationships in determining whether the medical procedure was in the child’s best interests.179
Importantly, to give true effect to the best interests of the child, the focus must be
on the particular child at hand and not on children as a class.180 Thus, if best-interests
analyses are focused on individualized, subjective determinations, then close consideration should be given to the context in which the child will live and the various influences on the child.181
IV. ANALYZING CIRCUMCISION UNDER BOTH APPROACHES
Having established in Part II that bans on circumcision in the Jewish and Muslim
context must withstand strict scrutiny, this Note now addresses the constitutionality of
(“Over time, however, courts have come to confuse the best interests standard with the substituted judgment doctrine in certain situations and apply the substituted judgment doctrine
to cases in which it is not appropriate.”).
176
See DEVETTERE, supra note 172, at 101, 103.
177
See id. at 103.
178
Povenmire, supra note 1, at 111.
179
See Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319, 1331 (Ill. 1990) (noting that in many donor cases
the determination of best interests hinges on the closeness of the relationship between the prospective donor and the recipient); Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 145–46 (Ky. 1969) (finding that the parent’s consent to a kidney removal from the ward and donation to his brother was
in the best interests of the ward, because losing his brother would have been emotionally and
psychologically troubling).
180
See, e.g., Superintendent v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 430 (Mass. 1977). Here, in an
application of best interests analysis to determine whether to provide life-prolonging medical
treatment the court stated:
[W]e realize that an inquiry into what a majority of people would do in
circumstances that truly were similar assumes an objective viewpoint
not far removed from a “reasonable person” inquiry. While we recognize the value of this kind of indirect evidence, we should make it plain
that the primary test is subjective in nature—that is, the goal is to determine with as much accuracy as possible the wants and needs of the
individual involved.
Id.
181
See Bosze, 566 N.E.2d at 1326–32 (outlining the decisions of several courts which used
a variety of information in best-interests analysis, including the specific circumstances of
the child).
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bans as applied to Jewish and Muslim parents. More plainly, whether the severity of
the harm and risks associated with circumcision justify the state’s intrusion on parental
and free exercise rights.
Additionally, this Part addresses whether circumcision is in the best interests of
Jewish and Muslim infants. In doing so, the focus is on the medical and emotional
effects of circumcision. In the case of emotional considerations, the family context is
particularly important. Notably, accounting for family dynamics still complies with a
child-centered approach because the child-centered approach is not intended to eliminate the family context nor confer greater child-rearing power to the state.182 In complying with a child-centered approach, consideration is not given to the parents’ rights,
but rather to the factual reality that parents are the strongest influence on their children’s
beliefs.183 To focus on a contrived utopia where children are free from any influence
whatsoever would not realistically address the best interests of the infant. Moreover,
courts have allowed the best interests analysis to consider relationships that are emotionally connected to the medical decision.184 In this sense, this Note addresses circumcision in the context in which it is most likely to affect the relationships of Jewish and
Muslim infants—their parents and the respective religious community.
A. Strict Scrutiny
1. Circumcision Does Not Threaten the Infant’s Life or Expose the Infant to
Serious or Grievous Injury
The procedure for circumcision involves “the surgical removal of the foreskin
(prepuce) of the penis.”185 Anti-circumcision proponents often point to the pain of the
procedure as a reason to ban infant circumcision.186 While infants may experience some
pain during the procedure, doctors today commonly use a dorsile penile nerve block
(DPNB) to dull the pain.187 DPNB, which involves injecting the base of the penis with
lidocaine, has been found to be “very effective in reducing . . . pain.”188 Complications
182

Dwyer, supra note 119, at 1376.
See infra notes 249–51 and accompanying text.
184
See supra note 179.
185
WILBURTA Q. LINDH ET AL., DELMAR’S COMPREHENSIVE MEDICAL ASSISTING 704 (4th
ed. 2010).
186
See, e.g., Svoboda et al., supra note 134, at 109–11 (discussing pain as a harm caused by
neonatal circumcision).
187
ED SCHOEN, ED SCHOEN, M.D. ON CIRCUMCISION 21 (2005). The dorsile penile nerve
block is analogous to dental anesthesia and is commonly given to infants through a sugar
solution. Id.
188
Task Force on Circumcision, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Circumcision Policy Statement,
103 PEDIATRICS 686, 688 (1999) [hereinafter Task Force, Policy Statement]. To note, the
Academy updated its Circumcision Policy Statement in August 2012. The Academy now finds
that the benefits of circumcision outweigh the risks. This policy statement is addressed infra,
at notes 243–46 and accompanying text.
183
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associated with DPNB include bruising and rare instances of hematoma which usually
do not result in long-term injury.189 Other analgesic options include a topical anesthetic
agent referred to as eutectic mixture of local anesthetics, or EMLA, which is also effective in diminishing the pain for the infant.190 The advantage of topical anesthetics
is that they may be applied with no side-effects or complications.191
Jewish circumcisions may be performed in either a hospital, home, or synagogue.192
The procedure is carried out by a Mohel, who may be a doctor, but must be specifically trained for the procedure and deeply religious.193 Importantly, in keeping with
the Abrahamic tradition, the procedure must occur on the eighth day of life.194 Typically, Jewish infant circumcision is performed without the use of anesthesia, though
“[c]urrent Rabbinic authorities have ruled that it is permissible to use anesthesia in
neonatal circumcision as long as there is no danger involved.”195
Aside from pain, anti-circumcision advocates assert that circumcision should be
banned because the risks are too great and the benefits are a myth or illusory.196
Among the potential complications, anti-circumcision advocates point to meatal ulceration,197 hemorrhaging,198 infection,199 concealed penis,200 urethral fistula,201 urinary
retention,202 glans necrosis,203 injury to or loss of glans,204 excessive skin loss,205 and
preputial cysts.206
189

Task Force, Policy Statement, supra note 188, at 688.
See Franca Benini et al., Topical Anesthesia During Circumcision in Newborn Infants,
270 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 850, 850–51 (1993) (finding that EMLA helps diminish the pain felt
by newborns during circumcision and thus “may be a useful agent for pain management in
neonatal circumcision”).
191
I AVRAHAM STEINBERG, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JEWISH MEDICAL ETHICS 204 (Fred Rosner
trans., 1998).
192
ARYE FORTA, JUDAISM 73 (2d ed. 1995).
193
Id.
194
DOSICK, supra note 23, at 286.
195
STEINBERG, supra note 191, at 204.
196
See, e.g., NAT’L ORG. CIRCUMCISION INFO. RESOURCE CENTERS, http://www.nocirc.org/
(last visited Mar. 15, 2013) (noting that circumcision does not have a sufficient medical reason
and has unnecessary risks).
197
ROSEMARY ROMBERG, CIRCUMCISION: THE PAINFUL DILEMMA 200–03 (1985).
198
Id. at 206–08.
199
Id. at 208–10 (stating that infection is common with symptoms including fever, pus,
redness, and swelling).
200
Id. at 211–14.
201
Id. at 214–15.
202
Infants may potentially not urinate for several hours following the procedure. Id. at
217–18.
203
Id. at 218.
204
Id. at 219.
205
Id. at 219–21.
206
Id. at 223.
190

946

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:925

Despite critics’ claims, evidence suggests that their cries about the potential risks
or complications are overblown. In reality, “[n]ewborn circumcision is a quick and
simple operation with a very low rate of complications when properly performed.”207
Undoubtedly complications occur, but estimates are that complications occur in 0.3%
(about 1 in 300) of circumcisions.208 The most common complications are bleeding and
infection, and in most instances these are very minor and temporary.209 Meanwhile, the
risks noted by circumcision opponents are outliers and the product of isolated reports.210
The risks associated with circumcision are comparable with the risks of tonsillectomy, which the Court in Parham decribed as a procedure within the parents’ decisionmaking authority.211 Common complications resulting from tonsillectomy include
bleeding,212 sore throat,213 fever,214 dehydration,215 and amputation of the uvula.216 More
serious, complications, though isolated and rare, include hemorrhaging and death.217
The very fact that risks exist in circumcision procedures is not sufficient to shift the
balance of strict scrutiny in the state’s favor.218 Rather, in order for the state to meet
strict scrutiny, the risks must threaten the infant’s life or present a threat of serious or
grievous injury.219 Quite simply, pain and minor bleeding or infection do not implicate
death or serious injury concerns. No court has overridden parents’ religious claims
when presented with such minimal risks.220 Moreover, that isolated incidents of serious
injury may occur is covered by the existence of similarly rare, but serious, complications in tonsillectomy procedures—a procedure already noted by the Court as within
the realm of parents.221 In the case of circumcision, a state’s purported interest in protecting the child’s health and welfare is not sufficiently narrowly tailored to meet strict
scrutiny. A ban would therefore subject circumcision to state infringement, while
procedures presenting similar risks would be free from state regulation—this would
undercut any notion that the state finds its own reasons to be compelling.222
207
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2. Circumcision Is Not Analogous to Sterilization
It has been proposed that the legal treatment of circumcision should be equated
to the legal treatment of sterilization.223 Sterilization is one of the most common instances in which the state utilizes its parens patriae power.224 In sterilization cases,
parents cannot consent to the procedure without specific statutory authority, and they
also bear the burden of proving the procedure is medically necessary.225 Much of the
linkage centers on the fact that both procedures involve genitalia and personal bodily
integrity concerns.226 An important distinction in this regard, however, is the additional effect of sterilization—its complete elimination of the right to bear children.227
This greatly intensifies the seriousness of sterilization procedures as there is a constitutional right to procreate because of its essentiality to existence.228 This is further
concerning as sterilization could be used to eradicate or subordinate individual races
or ethnicities.229 Conversely, circumcision does not implicate procreation rights, and
bodily integrity arguments are left to cosmetics.230 In short, comparisons between the
two procedures are misguided.
B. Best Interests Considerations
1. Circumcision Is Medically Beneficial for Newborn Infants
Among the primary considerations of courts in best-interests analysis is the presence of a medical benefit.231 To this point, a recent study conducted by Aaron Tobian
and Ronald Gray, health epidemiologists at Johns Hopkins University, found that there
are lifelong health benefits associated with infant circumcision.232 Additionally, Tobian
223
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316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942))).
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See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (“We are dealing here with legislation which involves one
of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence
and survival of the race. The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching
and devastating effects.”).
229
See id.
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224

948

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:925

and Gray point out that the complication rate for infant circumcision “is substantially
lower than the complication rates of adult male circumcision.”233 This is likely due to
the fact that performing the procedure on adult males requires the use of general anesthesia and a more in-depth surgical procedure.234 This belies some anti-circumcision
advocates’ belief that it is in the best interests of the child to postpone the procedure
until the child reaches adulthood.235
Tobian and Gray further note that there are potential medical benefits in childhood:
Neonatal male circumcision provides other potential benefits during childhood such as prevention of infant urinary tract infections,
meatitis, balanitis, and phimosis, as well as protection from viral
STIs. Approximately 50% of high school students report having
sex prior to 18 years of age, so delaying male circumcision to age
18 years or older would deny children and adolescents these potential benefits.236
As further support for their findings, Tobian and Gray point to several recent studies
finding that circumcision helps reduce HIV risk by sixty percent, genital herpes by
thirty percent, and human papillomavirus by thirty-five percent.237 In addition to the
infant himself, there would be communal beneficiaries as well, namely females, who
could benefit from less genital herpes, bacterial vaginosis, trichomoniasis, and cervical
cancer.238 In their conclusion, Tobian and Gray argue that:
[b]ased on the medical evidence, banning infant male circumcision would deprive parents of the right to act on behalf of their
children’s health. Parents should be provided with information derived from evidence-based medicine about the risks and benefits
of male circumcision so that they can make an informed choice
for their children. It would be ethically questionable to deprive
them of this choice.239
infant circumcision has long-term health benefits, and that it would be ethically questionable
to deprive infants of this option).
233
Id. at 1480. Tobian and Gray find that while the rate of complication is between 0.2%
and 0.6% for infants, it is between 1.5% and 3.8% for adult males. Id.
234
See Task Force, Policy Statement, supra note 188, at 688.
235
See Povenmire, supra note 1, at 112 (advocating for a presumption that no child
would choose circumcision and would have the option to choose the procedure upon reaching adulthood).
236
Tobian & Gray, supra note 232, at 1480.
237
Id. at 1479–80.
238
Id. As a result of a decrease in the rates of STIs for both men and women there would
be societal economic benefits from the reduced medical cost from treating these diseases. See
id. at 1480.
239
Id.
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Tobian and Gray’s findings suggest, therefore, that circumcision is indeed in the
medical interests of the infant. By comparison, the significant long-term benefits
shown in their findings appear to outweigh the minimal and rare risks associated with
circumcision.240 Additionally, the benefits are certain to outlast any pain associated
with the procedure—though pain is already greatly diminished through the use of
analgesics.241 Certainly, their findings undermine any notion that courts should presume that no child would choose circumcision.242
In addition to Tobian and Gray, the Academy has acknowledged that there are
medical benefits associated with male infant circumcision.243 After developing a new
task force to study male circumcision in 2007, the Academy recently issued a policy
statement stating that the “preventive health benefits of elective circumcision of male
newborns outweigh the risks of the procedure.”244 The task force’s findings were similar to Tobian and Gray in that they found the benefits to be decreased rates of UTIs
and STDs, while the risks are minimal and rare.245 Moreover, in determining what is
in the best interests of the child, the Academy has found that “[i]t is legitimate for the
parents to take into account cultural, religious, and ethnic traditions, in addition to medical factors.”246 Accordingly, this is what the remainder of this Note attempts to do.
2. Circumcision Emotionally Benefits Jewish and Muslim Infants by Better
Preserving the Parent-Child Relationship
A starting point in considering the impact of the parent-child relationship in bestinterest analysis is that, from a child-centered perspective, the child has a constitutional
right to a relationship with his parent.247 Therefore, if possible, attempts should be made
to enhance this right and protect it.
In considering the best interests of the child, it is important to understand parentchild functioning within religion. After all, it is commonly accepted that parents are the
greatest influence on their child’s religious beliefs.248 While parents maintain a healthy
degree of influence in many aspects of their children’s lives, nowhere is their influence
greater than in the realm of religion.249 Parents have great influence on their child’s
240
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242
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religious views because parents are the primary teachers of religion, and children most
often feel a sense of trust and loyalty with their parents.250
The concept of parental influence is particularly relevant in Judaism, where family
is at the core of Jewish rituals and experience.251 Indeed, parents are expected to set a
standard of Jewish commitment for their children.252 The Torah, comprised in part of
the Book of Deuteronomy in the Bible, commands Jewish parents to teach their children the faith:
You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all
your soul and with all your might. And these words that I command you today shall be on your heart. You shall teach them
diligently to your children, and shall talk of them when you sit
in your house, and when you walk by the way, and when you lie
down, and when you rise.253
The importance of Jewish parental teaching of the faith is also captured by the
Talmud: “Our Rabbis taught: A father has the following obligations towards his
son—to circumcise him, to redeem him, if he is a firstborn, to teach him Torah, to
find him a wife, and to teach him a craft or a trade.”254
The importance of parents passing on the Jewish faith, especially the practice of
circumcision, should not be understated. Indeed, “[f]or devout Jews, a failure to circumcise their infant son would clearly be seen as a dereliction of their duty to foster
their child’s best interests by ensuring he enters properly—meaning through circumcision on the eighth day of his life—into the covenant with God.”255 In short, to Jewish
parents “[c]ircumcision [is] the sine qua non of Jewish identity,”256 and thus to abandon or disallow it is to essentially abandon or disallow Judaism.257
students found a correlation of 0.57 between the students’ religious behavior and their parents’
religious behavior. Id. at 99–100. The same study found a correlation of only 0.32 on political
behavior, 0.16 on entertainment, and 0.09 on miscellaneous beliefs, respectively. Id.
250
See DANIEL NYAKUNDI, WHO’S TELLING THE TRUTH? 36 (2008). Alongside the quality
of loyalty is that many children do not want to act in a disloyal manner toward their parents and
follow the parents’ religion as a result. See id.
251
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252
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255
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Benatar ed., 2006).
256
HOFFMAN, supra note 25, at 11.
257
In essence, bans on circumcision are bans on Judaism. While Jews could still claim
Jewishness and still perform many of the faith’s practices, an old and core practice would
vanish. Though this impact may not change the faith in scientifically observable ways outside
of the practice of circumcision itself, it is, in a sense, a ban on the practice. There can be no
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Much like in Judaism, the family is the bedrock of the Muslim community.258
Parental influence is especially critical as “[t]he most important responsibility of the
Muslim family is to guide children to an understanding of Islam.”259 Under Islamic
beliefs, the parent “will be held accountable for his or her upbringing on Judgment
Day.”260 As a result of this teaching, Muslim children are very knowledgeable about
their faith, leading one observer to state, “all they know is the Koran.”261
The parent-child religious correlation combined with the command that parents
of each faith raise their child in the practices of the faith—which would thereby include a belief in the necessity of circumcision262—suggests that the child will be influenced by his parents’ faith. In reality, it is more likely than not that the child will
adopt the same religious beliefs as his parents.263 From a practical perspective, this
should weigh in favor of infant male circumcision as it would strengthen the parentchild bond and most likely preserve his religiosity.
As an aside, there may be concerns that a court’s consideration of parental influence on the infant’s religious beliefs would create an Establishment Clause problem;264
namely, that a court would have to accept as true the parents’ religious beliefs, and this
would be preferring one religion over the other.265 This, however, is not the case. The
emphasis is not on the truth of the belief, but the mere fact that this belief will impact
the infant’s life.266 This simply means that given the fact that the child will be indoctrinated with this belief, best-interests analysis must consider if it would be beneficial
to the child to be in accordance with the belief.
To this end, circumcision is in the best interests of Jewish and Muslim infants
as it promotes the emotional benefit of religious solidarity with their parents’ beliefs.
Studies have shown that religious solidarity between parents and their child positively
affects the relationship.267 Moreover, the more strongly the religious beliefs are held by
quantification of the presence of the spiritual in religion, especially for Judaism where the
practice of circumcision lies at the root of the faith.
258
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the parent and the child, the stronger their bond.268 Additionally, parents and children
who have religious solidarity report having more positive relationships than parents
and children with differing beliefs.269 This strengthening of the relationship is notable
because research has found that the parent-child relationship impacts the emotional
well-being of children in a variety of ways including academic achievement, risk behaviors, mental health, and life satisfaction.270
Conversely, depriving Jewish and Muslim infants of the right to be circumcised
does not promote religious solidarity. Rather, it rejects the importance of religion in
parent-child relationships, and thus potentially deprives the child of some of the emotional benefits associated with a strong parent-child relationship. Trying to remove
the parents’ religious views from best-interests analysis does not protect and preserve
the child’s own religious views. To truly apply an individual, subjective best-interests
calculus, all relevant factors must be considered, including the impact religion will
have on the child’s life.
3. Permitting Circumcision Best Takes into Account Important Sociological and
Psychological Considerations
In light of parental influence on children’s religious beliefs, it is very likely that a
child born to Jewish parents will become Jewish, and that a child born to a Muslim family will become Muslim.271 Additionally, given the mandatory nature of circumcision
in both religions,272 it is likely that many of the infant’s future friends, as they grow up
in their religious communities, will be circumcised according to the religious mandate.
Even outside of the religious community, infant male circumcision is the norm in
American culture.273 Though scholars question the merits of the origins of circumcision in the United States,274 it has nevertheless, become a commonplace practice and
one of the most frequently performed surgical procedures in the United States.275 From
1997 to 2000, approximately 61% of infant males were circumcised.276 Scholars note,
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however, more recent declines in the practice of circumcision to suggest that circumcision is not as highly regarded as in days past.277 While there has been a decline, it has
not been as dramatic as some initial media reports suggested.278 Realistically, decline
in the practice of circumcision has been minimal. A study by the Center for Disease
Control and Prevention found that the rate of circumcision procedures declined from
2001 to 2008 by roughly five to six percent.279 Furthermore, the statistics are likely an
understatement of circumcision rates as the study did not consider circumcisions performed outside of the hospital, such as many Jewish circumcisions.280 Additionally,
the decline in circumcision may be misleading due to the growing number of states that
are no longer providing Medicaid funding for infant circumcisions.281 Despite scholars’
protestations of decline, circumcision still remains prevalent in American society and
to exclude it would arguably create a cultural divide.282
One of scholars’ main societal attacks on circumcision is that it is losing its importance in American culture.283 Once thought medically, aesthetically, and socially useful,
now anti-circumcision advocates argue circumcision is an unnecessary procedure.284
They attack the procedure, calling it nothing more than an archaic procedure with barbaric undertones.285 Indeed, they frame it as a procedure unnecessarily inflicting pain
on newborn infants for no justifiable reason—equivalent to a human rights abuse.286
In holding this view, however, scholars and the San Francisco ballot proposal
fail to recognize the potential sociological and psychological benefits of circumcision for Jewish and Muslim children. Opponents point to the potential psychological
harm on the infant due to the pain of the procedure.287 Human experience and useful
277
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analgesics suggest, however, that circumcised males recover from the pain without
ill effects, or possibly forget the experience altogether.288
Meanwhile more concrete research indicates that American children in minority
groups struggle both socially and psychologically.289 As minorities perceive their minority status, they attempt to counteract it by strongly identifying with their minority group
and perceiving the group as more homogeneous.290 However, as groups become more
homogeneous and dogmatic, the possibility of the black-sheep effect for some members
increases.291 In many cases the black-sheep member will be viewed less favorably than
members outside of the homogenous group altogether.292 Though the sociological and
psychological effects on children who are the black sheep have not been widely studied,
it is likely that they are similar to those of other types of rejection293: hurt feelings,294
loneliness,295 low self-esteem,296 aggression,297 and depression.298 Karen Bierman, a
psychologist at Pennsylvania State University, has found that children who suffer from
peer rejection exhibit four negative characteristics: “(1) low rates of prosocial behavior,
(2) high rates of aggressive/disruptive behavior, (3) high rates of inattentive/immature
behavior, and (4) high rates of socially anxious/avoidant behavior.”299
Importantly, circumcision is mandated in both the Jewish and Muslim faiths, and
notably for Jews, it has long been considered a distinguishing feature from Gentiles.300
Therefore, banning circumcision without religious exceptions would conceivably cause
young Jewish and Muslim boys to become outsiders within the religious communities
288
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in which they are raised.301 Considering the mandatory nature of the procedure for both
religions, it may cause the young boys to question their place and belonging within
the Jewish and Muslim faiths.
This potential sense of ostracism and identity crisis causes great social detriment
for young boys and adolescents.302 Adolescents who suffer ostracism and peer victimization from the group tend to isolate themselves and develop slowly socially.303 Among
adolescents’ biggest fears are rejection and attachment of a negative social stigma.304
As a result, young Jewish and Muslim boys may attempt to keep their uncircumcised
status a secret.305 Of course, given the importance of circumcision within both faiths,
it is unlikely to remain a secret for long.306
In sum, Jewish and Muslim boys may be forced into uncomfortable social interactions which damage them socially and psychologically. In light of this, the fractured
psychological state potentially created by group ostracism is clearly not in the best
interests of the child. Rather, permitting circumcision for Jewish and Muslim infants
would preserve their relationships with peers in the respective religious community
and protect them emotionally, socially, and psychologically.
CONCLUSION
Had the San Francisco ballot proposal been successful in banning circumcision, it
likely would have created a firestorm of litigation with a variety of competing interests.
In addressing these competing interests, two avenues are available: 1) a parental rights
theory, or 2) a child-centered approach. In addressing these two approaches, this Note
focused the inquiry to the specific context of Jewish and Muslim parents and infants.
Under a parental rights theory, Jewish and Muslim parents’ claims should be protected by strict scrutiny under the hybrid-rights exception in Smith.307 In applying strict
scrutiny analysis, states should have to show that circumcision subjects male infants to
serious bodily harm. Requiring any lesser standard would not comply with the narrow
301
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tailoring requirement of strict scrutiny as it would subject circumcision to state regulation, while other comparable procedures are not subjected to similar regulation.
Consequently, since the risks associated with circumcision are minimal, a state’s infringement on Jewish and Muslim parents’ parental and free exercise rights to have
their infant sons circumcised would be unconstitutional.
Under a child-centered inquiry, the focus should be on what is in the best interests
of the child. In analyzing the best interests of Jewish and Muslim infants, courts should
not focus solely on temporal interests. Doing so grossly undermines the best interests
analysis, which should focus on all medical and emotional benefits and detriments.
Expanding the scope beyond the temporal in the circumcision context reveals longterm medical and emotional benefits associated with the practice. These considerations debunk any notion that courts should hold a presumption that a child would
reject circumcision. Moreover, such a presumption rejects the subjectivity and individuality that is central to a true best interests analysis. Rather, the medical and emotional
benefits of circumcision for Jewish and Muslim infants indicate that the procedure is
arguably in their best interests.
Thus, the adoption of either a parental or child-centered focus in addressing the
circumcision of Jewish and Muslim infants should not affect the outcome. Under either
approach circumcision should be permissible for Jewish and Muslim infants.

